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CRIME AND BANISHMENT: PADILLA V.
KENTUCKY DEBUNKS THE MYTH THAT
DEPORTATION IS NOT PUNISHMENT
Lillian Chu*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under modern immigration law, a noncitizen convicted of a
crime may face a range of immigration consequences more severe
than imprisonment. Jose Padilla understands this better than anyone.
Kentucky authorities arrested Padilla, a truck driver, when a large
amount of marijuana was discovered in his tractor-trailer during a
weigh-station inspection.1 A lawful permanent resident of the United
States for over forty years,2 Padilla pleaded guilty to felony
marijuana trafficking, taking a plea bargain under the counsel of his
court-appointed attorney.3 Because Padilla’s crime is a removable
offense under U.S. immigration law,4 pleading guilty made Padilla
“subject to automatic deportation.”5
After realizing that deportation proceedings had been initiated
against him, Padilla appealed his conviction on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming he had accepted the plea
bargain in reliance on his attorney’s advice and that he had not
understood the true consequences of his plea when he made it.6
Padilla’s case highlights an ongoing debate in the legal field among
immigration law scholars: whether deportation is a direct
* J.D. May 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A. University of California, Los
Angeles. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professors Kathleen Kim and Samantha
Buckingham for their invaluable support and guidance. I would also like to thank the amazing
editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their patience and diligence in the
editing of this Comment.
1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Brief of Petitioner at 9–10, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
5. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
6. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 3, at 11.

1073

1074

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1073

consequence, and thus subject to the Strickland standard,7 or a
collateral consequence8 outside the scope of the Sixth Amendment.9
The U.S. Supreme Court’s finding that deportation is a unique
consequence intimately related to the criminal process, triggering
Strickland review, may be a “watershed decision in the immigration
rights area,” potentially affecting thousands of criminally accused
noncitizens facing immigration consequences.10
This Comment discusses the Supreme Court’s historic holding
in Padilla v. Kentucky.11 Part II of this Comment outlines the relevant
facts and procedural history. Part III provides a brief legal
background of the issues raised in Padilla. Part IV summarizes the
Supreme Court’s majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part
V offers a historical context to the changes in immigration law
affecting noncitizens like Padilla. Part VI argues why the Supreme
Court correctly recognized the unique relationship between
deportation and criminal convictions but notes that it still needs to
resolve whether the holding in Padilla is retroactive.
7. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are traditionally determined under the standard
set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S.
Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009) (discussing Strickland as the “general standard for ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claims” and emphasizing that the “Court has repeatedly applied that standard to
evaluate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims where there is no other Supreme Court
precedent directly on point”).
8. The law distinguishes between a guilty plea’s direct and collateral consequences. While
the courts require a defendant to understand the direct consequences of his plea for it to be valid,
it is generally accepted that a defendant does not have to know or understand the plea’s collateral
consequences to enter a valid plea. See infra Part III.A. The courts have found the following
examples of consequences to a conviction to be collateral: effects on parole or probation, civil
commitment, civil forfeiture, registration requirements, ineligibility to serve on a jury,
disqualification from public benefits, and ineligibility to possess firearms. Gabriel J. Chin &
Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 705 (2002).
9. Many legal scholars have debated the categorization of immigration consequences as
collateral and have argued that immigration consequences, and deportation in particular, are not
collateral consequences. E.g., Chin & Holmes, supra note 8; Sarah Keefe Molina, Rejecting the
Collateral Consequences Doctrine: Silence About Deportation May or May Not Violate
Strickland’s Performance Prong, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 267 (2006); Andrew Moore, Criminal
Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and The Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
665 (2008).
10. All Things Considered: High Court: Lawyers Must Give Immigration Advice (NPR radio
broadcast Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125420249
(providing transcript quoting Stephen Kinnaird, attorney for Padilla). A total of 97,133
noncitizens were removed on the basis of a criminal conviction in 2008. HOMELAND SEC.,
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 102
(2008).
11. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In September 2001, Jose Padilla,12 a licensed commercial truck
driver, drove his tractor-trailer through Hardin County, Kentucky,
and stopped at a weigh station. Authorities arrested Padilla at the
weigh station after he consented to allow inspection officers to
inspect his truck,13 which allegedly contained over 1,000 pounds of
marijuana.14 Padilla was indicted for misdemeanor possession of
marijuana, misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and
felony trafficking in marijuana.15
Padilla initially pleaded not guilty but was then offered a plea
bargain that gave him five years in prison if he pleaded guilty to the
misdemeanor possession and felony trafficking counts.16 During the
plea discussions, Padilla’s attorney advised him that he “did not have
to worry about immigration status since he had been in this country
so long.”17 This advice was wrong.18 Like most drug offenses, other
than most simple marijuana possession cases, Padilla’s felony drug
conviction was a deportable crime and an aggravated felony under
immigration law.19 Shortly after Padilla entered a guilty plea,20 he
12. Padilla was born in Honduras in 1950 and came to the United States in the 1960s. Brief
of Petitioner, supra note 3, at 8. He served in the U.S. military during the Vietnam War and had
been lawfully residing in California with his family for over forty years. Id.
13. Brief of Respondent at 2, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651).
14. Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651). According
to Kentucky, Padilla gave his written and signed consent to allow an officer with the Kentucky
Vehicle Enforcement search Padilla’s person, truck, trailer, and belongings. Brief of Respondent,
supra note 13, at 2. After evidence of marijuana use was discovered in the passenger
compartment of the truck, police detained Padilla and read him his Miranda rights; Padilla
allegedly signed a waiver of those rights. Id. at 3. Officers then searched the trailer with Padilla’s
assistance and found twenty-three Styrofoam boxes. Id. When asked what was in the boxes,
Padilla supposedly said, “Maybe drugs.” Id.
15. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 3, at 8. Padilla initially pleaded not guilty and was
released on bond until the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) lodged an immigration
detainer, which resulted in the District Court’s revocation of bail. Id. Because Padilla’s counsel
failed to raise the fact that Padilla was a lawful permanent resident with the district court, Padilla
spent a year in custody. Id. at 8–9.
16. Id. The plea agreement “provided only meager benefit to Padilla” by recommending the
maximum concurrent ten-year sentence, with five years served and five probated. Id. at 9–10.
17. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, the language of the agreed-upon plea and sentence did not change the petitioner’s
belief that the plea would not affect his immigration status. Id.
18. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1477 n.1.
19. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B)(i) (2006); Brief of Petitioner, supra note 3, at 11; see
also Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 n.1 (noting that “virtually every drug offense except for only the
most insignificant marijuana offenses” is a deportable offense).
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was issued an immigration detainer.21
Padilla subsequently filed a pro se motion for post-conviction
relief, asking the Hardin Circuit Court to vacate his plea based on his
attorney’s misadvice about the immigration consequences of his
plea.22 In 2004, the Hardin Circuit Court denied Padilla’s motion.23
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the Hardin Circuit Court, finding that an attorney’s misadvice
regarding deportation consequences qualified as ineffective
assistance of counsel.24 The Kentucky Court of Appeals remanded
the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Padilla had been misadvised, and if so, whether that
misadvice prevented Padilla from entering a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary guilty plea.25
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in a 5–2 decision, denying Padilla post-conviction relief
without the benefit of a hearing.26 In its opinion, the Kentucky
Supreme Court held:
As collateral consequences are outside the scope of the
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it
follows that counsel’s failure to advise Appellee of such
collateral issue or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly
provides no basis for relief. In neither instance is the matter
required to be addressed by counsel, and so an attorney’s
20. Padilla entered a guilty plea on August 22, 2002. Brief of Respondent, supra note 13, at
4.
21. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 3–4.
22. Id. As Padilla later explained in his brief to the Supreme Court, his attorney “failed to
investigate the immigration consequences associated with the proposed plea, and yet nonetheless
affirmatively advised his client” that there was nothing to worry about. Brief of Petitioner, supra
note 3, at 11.
23. “Padilla cannot show ineffective assistance of counsel merely because of a statement of
opinion [by his attorney] on whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service would choose to
deport Padilla given his length of time in the United States.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 14, at 4.
24. Id. at 5 (“We are persuaded that counsel’s wrong advice regarding deportation could
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
25. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 3, at 12–13. The Kentucky Court of Appeals decision was
a split decision (2–1). Brief of Respondent, supra note 13, at 6.
26. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1473
(2010). Justice Cunningham dissented, along with Justice Schroder, arguing: “Counsel who gives
erroneous advice to a client which influences a felony conviction is worse than no lawyer at all.
Common sense dictates that such deficient lawyering goes to effectiveness.” Id. (Cunningham, J.,
dissenting).
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failure in that regard cannot constitute ineffectiveness . . . .27
Padilla appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Doctrine of Direct Versus Collateral Consequences
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Brady v. United States28 that a
guilty plea is valid only when it is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent.29 Under Brady, a guilty plea meets the “voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent” standard only where a defendant has been
properly advised regarding the consequences of his plea. Courts have
broadly applied Brady when evaluating ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in which a defendant pleads guilty.30 The Court’s
opinion in Brady, however, suggested that a defendant need only be
properly informed of the direct consequences of his plea for that plea
to fulfill the voluntary, knowing, and intelligent requirement.31 This
implication gave rise to the doctrine that a defendant not informed or
misinformed on non-direct (or collateral) consequences may still
have given a valid plea.32
27. Id. (majority opinion). The Kentucky Supreme Court in Padilla and in Commonwealth v.
Furtado, 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005), followed the collateral-consequences doctrine, and found
that deportation as a consequence to the guilty plea could not trigger an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Id.; Furtado, 170 S.W.3d at 386 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment requires representation
encompassing only the criminal prosecution itself and the direct consequences thereof.”).
28. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
29. Id. at 748. The Brady Court found that “a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be
accepted only with care and discernment” and thus, to be valid, a plea “must [not only] be
voluntary but must be [a] knowing, intelligent act[] . . . done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. Similarly, just one year prior to Brady, the
Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), noted that “[s]everal federal constitutional
rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered,” and thus, such a
plea “cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in
relation to the facts.” 395 U.S. at 243 & n.5 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466
(1938)).
30. Chin & Holmes, supra note 8, at 726 (“[T]he doctrine provides a test for determining the
voluntary and intelligent character of the plea, it is applied both to the trial court—as a measure of
its performance in establishing the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea before accepting
it—and to defense counsel—as a measure of his performance in providing a defendant with the
information necessary to render the plea voluntary and intelligent.” (quoting Santos v. Kolb, 880
F.2d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 1989))).
31. Id. at 728 (“[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences,
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel, must stand . . . .”) (quoting Banda v. United States, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 755)).
32. See id. at 726 (“The collateral consequences rule is based in large part on the Brady
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Direct consequences have generally been defined as
consequences having “definite, immediate and largely automatic
effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.”33 In contrast,
collateral consequences are “not within the control and responsibility
of the district court.”34 The collateral-consequences doctrine is
misleading, however, in light of how serious these consequences can
be.35 Indeed, the collateral consequences of a guilty plea may be far
more significant than the sentence itself, such as in the case of
deportation.36 Considering the severity of certain collateral
consequences, it is surprising and unfortunate that courts reviewing
ineffective counsel claims have consistently applied the collateralconsequences doctrine.37
Court’s implication that a trial court need advise a defendant only of direct consequences to
render a plea voluntary under the Due Process Clause.”). Federal circuits have widely interpreted
Brady as drawing a distinction between direct and collateral consequences. E.g., United States v.
Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“We presume that the Supreme Court meant what it
said when it used the word ‘direct’; by doing so, it excluded collateral consequences.”).
33. United States v. Littlejohn, 224 F.3d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Torrey v. Estelle,
842 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1988)); United States v. Lambros, 544 F.2d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 1976);
see John J. Francis, Failure to Advise Noncitizens of Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Should This Be Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
691, 710 & n.109 (2003).
34. United States v. El-Nobani, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002).
35. Collateral consequences range from ineligibility for various federal benefits (such as
federally funded health care benefits, food stamps, housing assistance, education funding) to
losing the right to vote or enlist in the military, to having driving privileges suspended. Chin &
Holmes, supra note 8, at 699–700. Of the myriad of collateral consequences, deportation is
probably one of the most severe. As the Court in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893), stated:
[I]t needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is
punishment. Everyone knows that to be forcibly taken away from home and family and
friends and business and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is
punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.
Id. at 740.
36. For instance, courts have held defense counsel to be effective when the defendant was
advised to plead guilty to trivial offenses, such as stealing cigarettes, but not told that the
conviction would result in deportation. Chin & Holmes, supra note 8, at 700 & n.23; see also
Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5,
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651) (discussing how deportation “tear[s]
apart families and disrupt[s] long-settled expectations,” so that for noncitizens, deportation may
be “the most important consideration in deciding whether to accept a guilty plea”).
37. Chin & Holmes, supra note 8, at 703 (“[A]ll courts that have considered the issue [of
effective assistance of counsel] have held that defense lawyers must explain the direct
consequences of a plea, such as length of imprisonment and amount of fine, but need not explain
‘collateral consequences,’ such as . . . that the plea may result in deportation.”); see, e.g.,
Littlejohn, 224 F.3d at 965; Kincade v. United States, 559 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1977); see also
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 n.9 (citing cases following the collateral-consequences doctrine).
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Under this distinction between direct and collateral
consequences, immigration repercussions such as deportation
inevitably fall under the umbrella of collateral consequences.38 The
reasoning here is straightforward: an immigration consequence is not
punishment directly imposed by the criminal court and therefore is
collateral in nature.39 Although federal circuit courts and state courts
have both generally accepted this reasoning,40 modern immigration
law has made all but the most minor offenses deportable, and even
minor or misdemeanor convictions may trigger automatic
deportation.41
B. The Strickland Standard for Sixth Amendment
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
The Sixth Amendment ensures a defendant’s right to “have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”42 In Strickland v.
Washington,43 the Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test for
determining whether a defense attorney’s advice violated the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee to effective assistance.44 The first prong of
38. United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that all circuits that
have addressed the question of immigration consequences, “have concluded that ‘deportation is a
collateral consequence of the criminal process and hence the failure to advise does not amount to
ineffective assistance of counsel’”) (quoting United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir.
1993)); accord United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); Varlea v. Kaiser, 976
F.2d 1357, 1358 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6, 7–8 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d
764, 769 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1975).
39. Francis, supra note 33, at 709; see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–32 (1954)
(holding that deportation is a civil penalty rather than a criminal punishment).
40. While the federal courts have by and large categorized immigration consequences as
collateral, most but not all state courts have agreed. California courts, for instance, have held that
it is ineffective assistance of counsel if a defense attorney fails to investigate immigration
consequences and advise a noncitizen on these consequences before a plea. People v. Soriano,
240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 336 (Ct. App. 1987). Also, the California Supreme Court has found that
affirmative misadvice to a noncitizen regarding the immigration consequences of a plea satisfies
the deficiency prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel. See In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d
1171, 1174 (Cal. 2001) (“[A]ffirmative misadvice regarding immigration consequences may,
depending on the circumstances of the particular case, constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel.”).
41. See infra Part IV.A; see also Nina Bernstein, How One Marijuana Cigarette May Lead
to Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at A17 (reporting the story of adult legal resident
facing deportation to Haiti, a country he left at age three, after being found with one marijuana
cigarette).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
43. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
44. Id. at 687.
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the Strickland test asks whether counsel’s representation “fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness”45 and looks to prevailing
professional norms as the reasonable standard.46 The second prong
requires “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”47
Under the collateral-consequences doctrine, the Sixth
Amendment, as well as the Strickland standard, is only triggered
when a defendant claims his defense attorney failed to properly
advise him regarding the direct consequences of his guilty plea.48 A
failure to advise a criminal defendant on collateral consequences
would not require a Strickland analysis because defense counsel is
not required to cover such effects.49
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky
Supreme Court, holding that defense counsel has a constitutional
obligation to inform a noncitizen client regarding the risk of
deportation associated with a guilty plea.50 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Stevens, dodged the larger questions surrounding
the collateral-consequences doctrine but carved out an exception to
the doctrine for deportation.51 Specifically, the majority rejected the
distinction drawn between direct and collateral consequences in
Padilla’s case because “deportation is a particularly severe ‘penalty’”
and “intimately related to the criminal process.”52 The majority based
this conclusion on its finding that deportation has become unique in
45. Id. at 687–88 (“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”).
46. Id. at 688 (“The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms.”).
47. Id. at 694. Without prejudice, “professionally unreasonable” performance by defense
counsel does not constitute “ineffective assistance” under the Constitution. Id. at 691–92.
48. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 8, at 703–10.
49. Id.
50. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010).
51. Id. at 1481.
52. Id.
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its severity and relationship to the criminal process because modern
immigration law has made deportation “virtually inevitable for a vast
number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.”53 Discussing the
evolution of immigration law and the gradual elimination of
discretionary relief for noncitizens convicted of crimes facing
deportation,54 the majority stated that under contemporary
circumstances, the close connection between deportation and the
criminal process made deportation “uniquely difficult to classify as
either a direct or collateral consequence.”55 Noting that the specific
risk of deportation is ill suited to analysis under the collateralconsequences doctrine, the majority decided to apply the two-prong
Strickland test.56
To determine whether Padilla’s attorney’s conduct fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland’s first prong,
the majority looked at the “prevailing professional norms,” which
appeared to “universally require defense attorneys to advise as to the
risk of deportation consequences.”57 In its reasoning, the majority
recognized that “[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the
United States may be more important to the client than any potential
jail sentence.”58 Because “the terms of the relevant immigration
statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal
consequence for Padilla’s conviction”59 and “Padilla’s counsel could
have easily determined that his plea would make him eligible for
deportation,” the majority reasoned that Padilla’s attorney’s conduct
was unreasonable under Strickland’s first prong.60 The Court
53. Id. at 1478.
54. Id. at 1478–82.
55. Id. at 1482.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Law Professors as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 12–14, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651)).
58. Id. at 1483 (alteration in the original) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001)).
59. Id. The majority pointed out that this is particularly true for drug convictions, because
section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and National Act (INA) states:
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States or a
foreign country relating to a controlled substance[], other than a single offense
involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006)).
60. Id.
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remanded the case for determination on whether Padilla was
prejudiced as a result of his attorney’s misadvice, as required under
Strickland’s second prong.61
B. Justice Alito’s Concurrence
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, agreed with the
majority in the conclusion that “a criminal defense attorney fails to
provide effective assistance within the meaning of Strickland . . . if
the attorney misleads a noncitizen client regarding the removal
consequences.”62 Justice Alito agreed that in Padilla’s case, defense
counsel misled Padilla by advising him not “to worry about
immigration status since he had been in the country so long.”63
According to Justice Alito, “[A]n attorney must (1) refrain from
unreasonably providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant
that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration
consequences and that, if the alien wants advice on this issue, the
alien should consult an immigration attorney.”64
Justice Alito disagreed, however, that “the attorney must attempt
to explain what [deportation] consequences may be,” as the
majority’s language suggested.65 According to Justice Alito,
[w]hile the line between “direct” and “collateral”
consequences is not always clear . . . the collateralconsequences rule expresses an important truth: Criminal
defense attorneys have expertise regarding the conduct of
criminal proceedings. They are not expected to possess—
and very often do not possess—expertise in other areas of
the law, and it is unrealistic to expect them to provide
expert advice on matters that lie outside their area of
61. Id. at 1483–84.
62. Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 1478 (majority opinion) (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483
(Ky. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1473).
64. Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring).
65. Id. The majority acknowledged “[i]mmigration law can be complex” and that “[t]here
will . . . undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a
particular plea are unclear or uncertain.” Id. at 1483 (majority opinion). In contrast to Alito,
however, the majority states that in such situations, “[w]hen the law is not succinct and
straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client
that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences,” but
“[w]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally
clear.” Id.
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training and experience.66
C. Justice Scalia’s Dissent
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas
joined, stated that “[t]he Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a
lawyer ‘for his defense’ against a ‘criminal prosecutio[n]’—not for
sound advice about the collateral consequences of conviction.”67
Declaring that “[t]he Constitution . . . is not an all-purpose tool for
judicial construction of a perfect world,” Justice Scalia criticized
both the majority and the concurrence for going beyond
“constitutional commands” and argued that this issue is best left to
statutory resolution.68
V. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK FOR REMOVAL OF
NONCITIZENS WHO ARE CONVICTED OF CRIMES
While there was no general federal law regulating the admission
of aliens for the first one hundred years of U.S. history, one of the
first immigration laws—the Act of March 3, 1875—specifically
prohibited entry to noncitizen prostitutes and convicted criminals.69
Despite the long relationship between criminal conduct and
immigration rights, deportation on the basis of criminal conduct
within U.S. borders did not arise until the Immigration and National
Act (INA) of 1917, which authorized deportation as the consequence
of certain criminal convictions.70 Built into the 1917 INA, however,
was discretionary judicial power allowing both state and federal
66. Id. at 1487–88 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito appears to follow the argument raised
by the United States. The United States argued as amicus curiae that there was no affirmative
duty on defense counsel to raise the issue of deportation consequences with his client about to
plea, but that if the issue was raised, defense counsel then had a duty to give competent advice.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 14, 20, Padilla, 130 S. Ct.
1473 (No. 08-651). This duty to give correct advice, however, might be satisfied by simply
stating that there are potential immigration consequences and referring the client to an
immigration attorney. See id. at 24–25 (stating that counsel is under a duty to provide reasonably
competent advice “if she chooses to speak” but pointing out that “she could decline to give advice
in the matter”).
67. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original).
68. Id. at 1494–97.
69. WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 3 (2008). Until 1874, the United States
experienced “unrestricted immigration.” Id. at 2.
70. Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889–90; Padilla, 130 S.
Ct. at 1478–79.
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judges to recommend against deportation regardless of the
conviction.71 The power of judicial recommendation against
deportation (JRAD) acted as a procedural protection to “ameliorate
unjust results on a case-by-case basis.”72
As Justice Stevens pointed out in his majority opinion, “The
landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over
the last 90 years.”73 While courts previously evaluated deportation
cases on the facts and circumstances unique to each case, there has
been a policy shift toward a legislatively structured classification
system where “one-size-fits-all.”74 Immigration reform legislation
has essentially eliminated JRAD power since 1917.75
In addition to the policy shift toward a categorical approach to
deportation, recent legislation has increased the number of offenses
mandating deportation. In particular, the 1996 passages of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)
and the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
have “rendered the immigration consequences of convictions for
many crimes more certain, immediate, and severe.”76 The INA now
requires deportation of noncitizens who have been convicted of a
crime qualifying as an “aggravated felony.”77 Because the 1996
amendments expanded the number of offenses that qualify as
aggravated felonies, convictions for relatively minor state law
crimes, which previously were not removable offenses, can now

71. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1478.
74. Francis, supra note 33, at 699. The main reasons for this policy shift have been (1) an
increasing number of noncitizens entering the penal system, and (2) an increasingly negative
attitude towards immigrants, which was expounded by terrorist attacks (such as the 1993 attack
on the World Trade Center, the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City, and the September 11, 2001
attacks). Id. at 700.
75. The JRAD power was first circumscribed in the 1952 INA. Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 182. See Gerald Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law
After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1967–68 (2000). In 1990, Congress
took away the JRAD power. Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505(b), 104 Stat.
5050. See generally Allison Leal Parker, In Through the Out Door? Retaining Judicial Review for
Deported Lawful Permanent Resident Aliens, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 608–13 (2001)
(discussing how Congress limited alien access to the federal courts in the second half of the
twentieth century).
76. Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 36, at 6.
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
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result in mandatory deportation.78 A conviction for an aggravated
felony practically ensures that the noncitizen will be deported
because an immigration judge no longer has discretion to grant relief
in such a case.79
This shift in immigration policy toward a classification system
for deportation cases and the continued expansion of offenses
mandating deportation has “dramatically raised the stakes of a
noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”80 Today, accurate criminal legal
advice for noncitizens has never been more important.81
V. ANALYSIS
A. Deportation Has a Unique and Intimate
Relationship to Criminal Proceedings
Rather than resolve the debate about whether there is a
distinction between direct and collateral consequences under the
Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Padilla dodged the issue by
focusing on “the unique nature of deportation.”82 In light of the
severity of deportation and the likelihood of such a consequence
under modern immigration law, the majority correctly found
78. Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 36, at 6. A major factor in determining whether an offense is an aggravated felony is
the length of the prison sentence. Francis, supra note 33, at 701. The 1996 amendments reduced
the qualifying length of a prison sentence from five years to only one year. Id. The result is that
an offense classified as a misdemeanor under state law could be classified as aggravated felony
under the INA. Id. For example, in United States v. Christopher, 239 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2001),
the Eleventh Circuit upheld a finding that a conviction for shoplifting, a misdemeanor in the state
in which the defendant was convicted, that resulted in a twelve-month sentence qualified as an
aggravated felony under the INA. Id. at 1193; see also Helen Morris, Zero Tolerance: The
Increasing Criminalization of Immigration Law, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1317, 1324 (1997)
(“The term ‘aggravated felony’ is not a concept of criminal law, but rather an invention of
immigration law. . . . [Some] offenses classified as aggravated felonies . . . are not what would
typically be thought of as ‘particularly serious.’”).
79. Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 36, at 7 & n.9 (“Only in extraordinary circumstances can a conviction for an
aggravated felony not lead to mandatory deportation. For example, non-citizens convicted of
aggravated felonies who can show that they will be subject to torture if deported . . . might
qualify for relief . . . .”).
80. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
81. See Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 36, at 5 (“Because detention and deportation tear apart families and disrupt
long-settled expectations, for many non-citizens, the immigration consequences of a particular
conviction are the most important consideration in deciding whether to accept a guilty plea.”).
82. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
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deportation to be unique and beyond the direct-and-collateral
distinction. As argued in the amici briefs of various national criminal
defense and immigration organizations,
[a] criminal defendant’s immigration status affects every
stage of the criminal process, from pre-trial proceedings
through post-conviction confinement. The non-citizen also
faces the potential consequences of deportation—
permanent exile from perhaps the only country he has ever
really known—with a single ill-advised plea.83
Although deportation is not a punishment meted out by the
criminal courts and thus not strictly considered a criminal sanction,
the Supreme Court has nevertheless historically recognized that
deportation is a severe penalty resulting from a conviction.84 This is
especially true as the evolution of immigration law has virtually
guaranteed that most noncitizens will be deported if they are
convicted of a crime.85
B. Strickland Provides the Appropriate Standard for
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Based on Failure to
Properly Advise Regarding Deportation Consequences
Under the Sixth Amendment, the criminally accused have a right
to effective counsel.86 This is an essential part of the fundamental
right to a fair trial.87 In Strickland, the Supreme Court recognized the
83. Brief for the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 4, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651).
84. Id.; see also Francis, supra note 33, at 693 (“For non-citizens, deportation is often a
more serious consequence than the maximum statutory penalty of a criminal offense.”).
85. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. It is also worth noting that there has been a dramatic increase
in the number of noncitizens deported based on criminal convictions or charges in the last few
decades, though it is unclear what the direct correlation is between this increase and the
harshening of immigration laws. DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS P’SHIP, REPRESENTING NONCITIZEN
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS: A NATIONAL GUIDE 3 (2008), available at http://www.tulsalaw.com/
pdfs/DIP-National-Training-2008-Manual.pdf (“In fiscal year 2004, the [Department of
Homeland Security] removed 42,510 noncitizens based on criminal grounds, compared to only
1,221 noncitizens deported or excluded based on criminal grounds twenty years earlier in fiscal
year 1984.”); see also STEVEN A. CAMAROTA & JESSICA M. VAUGHAN, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION
STUDIES, IMMIGRATION AND CRIME: ASSESSING A CONFLICTED ISSUE 2 (2009) (“From 1998 to
2007, 816,000 criminal aliens were removed from the United States because of a criminal charge
or conviction. This is equal to about one-fifth of the nation’s total jail and prison population.”).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Greta Van Susteren, The Responsibility of a Criminal Defense
Attorney, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 125, 125–26 (1996) (discussing the difficulty of defining the term
“effective counsel”).
87. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984); see also McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective
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critical role an attorney plays under the Sixth Amendment88 and
established a two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.89 The Strickland Court established that representation of a
criminal defendant comprises certain duties, including “the
overarching duty to advocate the defendant’s cause and the more
particular duties to consult with the defendant on important
decisions . . . .”90
The Court properly decided to apply Strickland to Padilla’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because immigration
consequences often take priority in the minds of noncitizens making
strategic plea decisions.91 For many, such as Padilla, deportation may
be the ultimate punishment, permanently and cruelly separating the
individual from home and family.92 Because deportation is a
consequence that is “certain, immediate, and severe,” advisement on
such an important risk should be included under a defense attorney’s
duty to counsel.93 As argued by Padilla’s attorney during oral
argument to the Supreme Court, a defense attorney for a noncitizen
facing a criminal conviction is obligated to competently represent his
client by properly assessing the legal risks of each decision,
including deportation.94 Just like any other criminal proceeding in
which advisement is necessary to help a defendant make decision;
advisement on deportation risk is fundamental and should be
protected by the Sixth Amendment.95 Thus, whether these obligations
are met is appropriately assessed under Strickland.
C. Applying Strickland, Proper Advisement on Deportation Risk
assistance of counsel.”).
88. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685–86 (acknowledging the “vital importance of counsel’s
assistance”).
89. Id. at 687–88; see supra Part III.B.
90. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
91. Brief for the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 83, at 4–6.
92. Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 36, at 5; see Brief of Petitioner, supra note 3, at 12; Brief for Asian American Justice
Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 36, at 5.
93. Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 36, at 6.
94. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08651) (stating that defense counsel “has an obligation to competently represent him, competently
assess the legal risks, and advise the client” because these duties “are fundamental to lawyering”).
95. Id. at 3, 9–10.

1088

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1073

Is Reasonable Under Prevailing Professional Norms
The Padilla majority correctly determined that prevailing
professional norms indicate that competent defense attorneys not
only must give appropriate advice regarding deportation risk (which
may be simply to identify the risk and refer the client to an
immigration specialist)96 but also must raise the issue of deportation
risk when necessary.97 Contrary to Justice Alito’s opinion, criminal
defense and immigration associations generally agree that prevailing
professional standards require defense attorneys to advise noncitizen
clients about deportation risks.98 Additionally, the Padilla majority
consulted and directly cited numerous and varied treatises and
practitioners guides, all indicating the prevailing professional norm
of properly advising a client regarding deportation risk.99
D. The Padilla Majority Should Have Specified
That Padilla Would Be Retroactive
Whether the holding in Padilla is retroactive is a pressing
question facing federal and state judges, as well as criminal defense
practitioners seeking post-conviction relief for their clients. When
courts review requests for post-conviction relief, they apply the law
that existed at the time a case became “final.”100 Thus, for noncitzens
currently seeking post-conviction relief to benefit from Padilla, its
holding must be found to be retroactive. Arguably, Padilla’s
majority’s language implies that it considered the potential
retroactive application of its holding—and believed there would be
limited retroactive consequences—because defense attorneys were
already obligated under professional norms to provide advice on
96. When the law is unclear, “a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a
noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was here, the duty to
give correct advice is equally clear.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.
97. Id. at 1483–84.
98. E.g., Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 57, at 12–14 (“[A]uthorities of every stripe—
including the American Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations,
authoritative treatises, and state and city bar publications—universally require defense attorneys
to advise as to the risk of deportation consequences for non-citizen clients.”).
99. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
100. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320–21 (1987). “By ‘final,’ we mean a case in which
a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for
a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.” Id.
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deportation risk.101 The Padilla Court, however, stopped short of
saying specifically that its ruling was retroactive for collateral attacks
on guilty pleas that had occurred prior to Padilla.
A decision of the Supreme Court is retroactive unless “the Court
has expressly declared a rule . . . to be a clear break with the past.”102
Where the Court has “merely has applied settled precedents to new
and different factual situations, no real question has arisen as to
whether the later decision should apply retrospectively.”103 The issue
whether Padilla applied settled precedent or established a clear break
from the past is not yet resolved.104 While it is difficult to determine
precisely how many individuals would have a potential ineffective
assistance of counsel claim if the holding in Padilla were retroactive,
a significant number of individuals would likely be affected. 105
Both state and federal courts have applied Padilla retroactively
to cases involving individuals facing pending deportation
proceedings as the result of a guilty plea.106 The issue of retroactivity,
however, has caused confusion and contradictory rulings within
jurisdictions.107 Although language in the Padilla opinion suggests
101. Id. at 1485 (“It seems unlikely that our decision today will have significant effect on
those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains. For at least the past 15 years,
professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the
deportation consequences of a client’s plea.”).
102. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted);
accord Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216 (1988).
103. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549 (“In such cases, it has been a foregone conclusion that the rule
of the later case applies in earlier cases, because the later decision has not in fact altered that rule
in any material way.”).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Obonaga, No. 07-CR-402, 2010 WL 2629748, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
June 24, 2010) (“It is unclear if Padilla applies retroactively. Reasonable jurists have disagreed
about whether Padilla has retroactive effect. And, because the Supreme Court issued Padilla less
than three months ago, the Second Circuit has not yet decided this issue.”).
105. The Government Accountability Office estimated in 2005 that the number of noncitizens
incarcerated in the federal prison system was 49,000, compromising approximately 27 percent of
the federal prison population. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION ON
CRIMINAL ALIENS INCARCERATED IN FEDERAL AND STATE PRISON AND LOCAL JAILS 2,5
(2005). Although this information cannot provide an estimate of how many noncitizens in the
country are in a situation similar to the plaintiff in Padilla, it does suggest that a significant
number of people could be impacted.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902–04 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
(finding that Padilla was an extension of Strickland and not a new rule); see also People v.
Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 404 (N.Y. 2010) (holding that Padilla did not create a new rule even
though deportation was previously considered a collateral consequence under New York law).
107. Noreleen G. Walder, Courts Differ About Retroactive Effect of High Court Counsel
Ruling, LAW.COM (July 27, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=
1202463921126.
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that the Supreme Court may have assumed its holding would be
retroactive, the Court failed to indicate this with specificity.108 This
issue will need to be clearly resolved in the near future whether by
circuit court consensus or the Supreme Court itself.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla v. Kentucky may
affect thousands of criminally accused noncitizens and their
attorneys. By defining deportation as a unique, intimate consequence
of criminal convictions, the Padilla Court properly acknowledged
the severity of deportation. The Court applied Strickland and
prevailing professional norms for defense attorneys and found that
the Sixth Amendment imposed a duty on defense counsel to provide
competent advice as to deportation risk. The Padilla Court, however,
failed to directly address the issue of whether its holding would be
retroactive—a question that needs to be answered in the near future.

108. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).

